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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
On October 4, 1989, Steven Staley walked into a Steak and Ale 
Restaurant in Tarrant County, Texas for dinner with his two friends Tracey 
Duke and Brenda Rayburn.1 After dinner and just prior to closing, Staley 
and Duke removed two semi-automatic pistols, gathered the employees of 
the restaurant, and demanded that the manager Robert Read open the cash 
register.2 Read then offered to serve as a hostage to Staley if he would 
promise to leave the other employees alone.3 Staley agreed, and as the 
police waited outside the restaurant, Staley, Duke and Rayburn exited the 
restaurant using Read as a human shield against the police.4 
Once outside the restaurant, Staley, Duke and Rayburn stole a car 
from the parking lot and shoved Read into the back of it.5 As the criminals 
sped away with Read as hostage, police raced after them and a high-speed 
car chase followed.6 The chase ended when the stolen car broke down, and 
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1 THE INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE PROJECT, http://www.internationaljusticeproject.org/ 
 illnessSstaley.cfm (last visited Dec. 3, 2013). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
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police found a murdered Read inside the car.7 Evidence later indicated that 
Read was shot in the head by both Staley and Duke.8  
A month earlier, Steven Staley had escaped from a correctional 
center in Denver, Colorado.9 Following the escape, Staley had gone on a 
rampage of nine armed robberies as he moved from Colorado to Texas with 
his last robbery being the one in Tarrant County.10 In April of 1991, Staley 
was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to the death penalty.11 After 
the trial court sentenced Staley to death, Staley exhausted his appeals 
options and was also denied relief on two applications for a writ of habeas 
corpus.12 Staley would be executed in February of 2006.13 
 
1.  Tortured Life 
 
One month before Steven Staley’s scheduled execution in 2006, he 
filed a motion with the trial court challenging his competency to be 
executed.14 Based on this challenge, the trial court ordered a psychiatric 
evaluation of Staley.15 Dr. Randall Price and Dr. Mark Cunningham were 
two of Staley’s evaluating psychiatrists. 16  Both doctors explained that 
Staley suffered from a severe form of paranoid schizophrenia that had been 
routinely diagnosed in the patient for over fifteen years, and that his disease 
had increasingly deteriorated over time.17  The doctors stated that Staley 
had been prescribed anti-psychotic medications since 1993 in an effort to 
control his schizophrenia symptoms, but that Staley had not consistently 
complied with his prescription.18 
Although the origin of schizophrenia has yet to be identified, 
scientists know there is a strong genetic link and predisposition for the 
disease because it often runs in families.19 Steven Staley’s family most 
definitely suffered from mental illness. Staley’s mother experienced severe 
mental illness during her lifetime. She was admitted to psychiatric hospitals 
on numerous occasions and was treated with psychiatric medications.20 
Staley was abused by his mother from an early age, and often exposed to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Staley v. State, 2013 WL 4829128, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 11, 2013). 
13 Id.  
14 Id.  
15 Id.  
16 Id.  
17 Id.  
18 Id.  
19  AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, http://www.psychiatry.org/schizophrenia (last 
visited Nov. 30, 2013).  
20 THE INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 1. 
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extremely violent behaviors.21 When he was six or seven years old, Staley’s 
mother tried to pound a wooden stake through his chest; at a later date, she 
attempted to stab both Staley and his sister with a butcher’s knife.22 Staley’s 
father was a severe alcoholic who was later killed in a traffic accident in 
1985. Staley’s maternal grandfather committed suicide, and Staley himself 
also attempted to commit suicide when he was 16 or 17.23  
After being incarcerated and on death row, Staley was hospitalized 
for psychiatric care ten times in total. Over the years, his behavior slowly 
deteriorated as he exhibited “psychotic, bizarre and, on occasions, hostile 
behavior . . . [as well as] hallucinations, paralysis and . . . delusional 
thinking.”24 During his incarceration, Staley also suffered from depression, 
and suicide precautions had to be taken.25 
Dr. Cunningham, one of the evaluating clinical and forensic 
psychologists, explained that Staley’s symptoms included “self inflicted 
injuries, grossly neglected personal hygiene, resting in his own excrement 
and urine, irregular eating and sleeping habits, including refusing food and 
fluids, delusions of paralysis, and lying on one spot in his cell so long as to 
rub a bald spot in the back of his head.”26 He explained that Staley had a 
history of refusing his medication and that long-term stabilization would 
require Staley to be involuntarily medicated.27 Dr. Price, another evaluating 
doctor, explained that Staley had frequently refused his medication because 
he denied he had an illness and believed “the medication was an attempt to 
‘poison’ him.”28 
Following a series of these psychiatric evaluations for Staley’s first 
competency hearing, the trial court ruled that Staley was incompetent to be 
executed. However, shortly after this ruling, the State filed a motion with 
the trial court requesting that Staley be involuntarily medicated in order to 
comply with his anti-psychotic medications.29 The State cited two interests 
in forcing Staley to be involuntarily medicated: a medical interest to control 
the symptoms of his psychosis and ease his suffering, and a State interest in 
enforcing his judgment of execution. 30  Staley disputed both of these 
interests and argued that psychotropic drugs can yield harmful side effects 
that challenge the medical purpose and that “artificial competence” 
achieved by medication does not constitute the standard for competency to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Emily Bazelon, Texas Wants To Drug a Prisoner So They Can Kill Him, SLATE (May 11, 
2012), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/crime/2012/05/the_execution_ 
 of_ steven_staley_forcible_medication_on_death_row_in_texas_.html. 
22 THE INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 1.  
23 Id.  
24 Id.  
25 Id.  
26 Staley v. State, 2013 WL 4829128, at *2 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 11, 2013). 
27 Id.  
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id.  
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be executed under the federal Constitution or the Texas Constitution.31 The 
dilemma that Staley faced was one that other mentally ill death row 
prisoners had faced. Without drugs, Staley risked facing horrible psychotic 
symptoms that were somewhat lessened by taking medications. However, 
with drugs, and as the current law defines, Staley was arguably sane enough 
for execution.32  
 
II.  MENTAL ILLNESS IN PRISON 
 
Mental illness and the prison system have long been closely related. 
In 2000, the American Psychiatric Association estimated that twenty 
percent of prisoners suffered from a serious mental illness, and up to five 
percent of those prisoners suffered from symptoms of active psychosis at 
any given time.33 In 2004, a study conducted by the Human Rights Watch 
concluded that out of the 2.1 million Americans in jails and prisons, as 
many as one in five prisoners are seriously mentally ill, while there are only 
about 80,000 patients residing in mental hospitals in America.34 As the 
country’s prison system has quadrupled over the past 30 years and more 
state hospitals have been closed, jails and prisons in America “have become 
the nation’s default mental health system,” far outnumbering the number of 
mentally ill people who are in mental hospitals.35 Jamie Fellner, one of the 
authors of the 2004 Human Rights Watch study, says that she found 
“enormous, unusual agreement among police, prison officials, judges, 
prosecutors and human rights lawyers that something has gone painfully 
awry with the criminal justice system” since jails and prisons now house 
more mentally ill persons than mental hospitals in America.36 
The Human Rights Watch study found that a life in prison only 
compounds the problems of the mentally ill who may have trouble 
following regimented prison rules or who may struggle with a life of 
solitary confinement.37  Solitary confinement can be particularly difficult 
for mentally ill inmates because the isolation is often psychologically 
destructive. This is especially true concerning death row inmates whose 
solitary confinement is commonly coupled with the psychological pressure 
of awaiting one’s execution date.  University of Tennessee Professor 
Dwight Aarons, whose particular area of scholarly interest is the death 
penalty, explains the conditions of solitary confinement for a death row 
prisoner:  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Id.  
32 See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990).  
33  Fox Butterfield, Study Finds Hundred of Thousands of Inmates Mentally Ill, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 22, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/22/national/22MENT.html. 
34 Id.  
35 Id.  
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
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We probably don’t fully appreciate getting up in the 
morning and having something to do. In prison, you just sit 
there with no TV, no radio, just the walls, the concrete, a 
bed, maybe a shower and a toilet. And that’s it . . . there are 
only so many hours you can sleep, only so many letters you 
want to write, and you have a limited number of books. And 
so it’s a terrific incentive to get out of your prison room, but 
there are still some that won’t behave, so they’re kept in 
their cell for 23 hours a day. And that anger and those 
mental health issues slowly continue to deteriorate because 
they’re not being let out . . . they’re angry, they’re isolated, 
they have a bad diet . . . you can almost anticipate mental 
health issues.38 
 
As Professor Aarons explains, the harsh conditions of solitary 
confinement make it extremely difficult to avoid mental illness in prison. 
Add to that the unique psychological pressures a death row inmate 
encounters waiting for his execution, and it is understandable that a high 
percentage of death row inmates suffer from severe mental illness. 
Researchers calculate that approximately 40 to 70 percent of death row 
inmates are psychotic.39 As one death row inmate wrote about life and 
psychosis on death row, “Prison is a place where grown men have gone 
insane. It is a place where men have been killed and where some have even 
killed themselves. Prison is hell.”40 
 
III.  INSANITY AND DEATH ROW 
 
Despite overwhelming evidence regarding the prevalence of mental 
illness in the prison system, especially mental illness in death row 
prisoners, the legal system does not recognize mental illness as a ban on 
execution. However, the legal system does recognize insanity as a ban on 
executing a prisoner.  
The ban on executing a prisoner who has lost his sanity dates back to 
the English common law where the practice was considered “savage and 
inhuman.”41 Sir Edward Coke expressed concerns about humanitarianism 
and about society losing the deterrent value of the death penalty in England 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Interview with Dwight Aarons, Professor of Criminal Law, University of Tennessee Law 
School, in Knoxville, Tenn. (Nov. 11, 2013).  
39 Julie D. Cantor, M.D., Of Pills and Needles: Involuntarily Medicating the Psychotic 
Inmate when Execution Looms, 2 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 119, 136 (2005). 
40 Greg Lefevre, Death Row Inmate Nominated for Nobel Peace Prize, CNN.com (Dec. 4, 
2000) http://edition.cnn.com/2000/US/12/02/death.row.nobel/. 
41 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406 (1986).  
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if the State put the insane to death.42 Coke was concerned because killing an 
insane man “can be no example to others.”43 Other explanations for the 
common law ban on executing the insane are that it “simply offends 
humanity,” 44  that madness is its own punishment, 45  and that the 
community’s pursuit for retribution is not served by executing an insane 
person “who has no comprehension of why he has been singled out and 
stripped of his fundamental right to life.”46 Despite differing reasons, the 
United States Supreme Court made it clear in Ford v. Wainwright that “no 
State in the Union permits the execution of the insane.”47 But it was not 
until the Court’s decision in Ford that an actual constitutional limit on 
executing insane prisoners was imposed.48  
In Ford, the Court held that the Eight Amendment’s ban on cruel 
and unusual punishment prevented the State from executing a prisoner who 
was insane.49 In reaching its decision, the majority noted that there was no 
single rationale for the ban, but rather, it explained: “[w]hether its aim be to 
protect the condemned from fear and pain without comfort of 
understanding, or to protect the dignity of society itself from the barbarity 
of exacting mindless vengeance, the restriction finds enforcement in the 
Eight Amendment.”50 
The majority further explained that its decision “explicitly 
recognized in our law a principle that has long resided there.”51 And while 
the majority made clear its position on the issue, it was Justice Powell’s 
concurring opinion that laid out an actual test for appropriately defining the 
type of mental deficiency that would trigger the Eight Amendment’s 
prohibition. Justice Powell stated that, “the Eighth Amendment forbids the 
execution only of those who are unaware of the punishment they are about 
to suffer and why they are to suffer it.”52 Justice Powell’s test, focusing on a 
death row prisoner’s understanding of the nature and purpose of the 
punishment he is to receive, is the legacy from Ford. However, the Court’s 
decision still left a lot of questions to be answered regarding the standard of 
determining mental insanity. 
 It was not until its 2007 decision in Panetti v. Quarterman that the 
United States Supreme Court again addressed the issue of a prisoner’s 
competency to be executed.53 In 1992, Scott Louis Panetti shot and killed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Id. at 407.  
43 Id.  
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 408. 
46 Id. at 409. 
47 Id. at 408.  
48 Id. at 410.  
49 Id.  
50 Id.   
51 Id. at 417. 
52 Id. at 422. (Powell, J., concurring).  
53 Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007).   
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his wife’s mother and father.54 Three years later, he was tried for capital 
murder and sought to represent himself.55  Despite a history of psychiatric 
hospitalization and a court evaluation that indicated Panetti suffered from 
mental illness and was prescribed substantial anti-psychotic drugs, Panetti 
was found competent to be tried and to waive counsel.56 In representing 
himself at trial, Panetti argued he was not guilty by reason of insanity and 
exhibited behavior that was later described as “‘bizarre,’ ‘scary,’ and 
‘trance-like.’”57 The Texas jury found Panetti guilty of capital murder and 
sentenced him to death.58 After his execution date was set, Panetti made an 
argument for the first time that he was not competent to be executed.59 
Panetti argued that he suffered from a severe mental illness and gross 
delusions that prevented him from comprehending the meaning and purpose 
of the death penalty.60 However, the lower courts rejected his claim of 
incompetency.61  
On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, the Court first 
stated that Panetti had “made a substantial showing of incompetency,” and 
that once a prisoner had done so, “the protection afforded by procedural due 
process includes a ‘fair hearing’ in accord with fundamental fairness.” The 
Court then took the opportunity to further clarify its holding from Ford 
regarding the meaning of competency to be executed.  The Court held that 
“[a] prisoner’s awareness of the State’s rationale for an execution is not the 
same as a rational understanding of it.”62 The Court explained that, in order 
for the death penalty to serve a proper purpose, the defendant must 
understand the link between his crime and the execution. Therefore, if a 
prisoner’s mental illness is so severe that he does not have a rational 
understanding of the reason for his execution, he is deemed incompetent 
under the Ford standard and cannot be executed. 
 
IV.  INVOLUNTARY MEDICATION 
 
 As previously mentioned, an overwhelming number of prisoners in 
the United States suffer from mental illness. Therefore, a significant amount 
of mental illness is treated within prison walls. But what happens when a 
prisoner does not want to be treated for his mental illness? There are certain 
constitutional protections for an inmate who wants to avoid unwanted 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Id. at 935. 
55 Id. at 936. 
56 Id. at 936. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 937. 
59 Id. at 938. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 942. 
62 Id. at 959.  
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medication, but those protections are not absolute.63 In Washington v. 
Harper, the United States Supreme Court held that, “given the requirements 
of the prison environment, the Due Process Clause permits the State to treat 
a prison inmate who has a serious mental illness with antipsychotic drugs 
against his will, if the inmate is dangerous to himself or others and the 
treatment is in the inmate’s medical interest.”64  
Walter Harper was sentenced to prison in Washington in 1976 for 
robbery, and for the next four years, he spent most of his time in the 
prison’s mental health unit where he consented to being administered 
antipsychotic drugs.65 Harper was briefly paroled from prison in 1980, but 
was forced to return the next year when he assaulted two nurses at a 
hospital.66 Upon returning to prison, Harper refused to take his prescribed 
antipsychotic drugs.67 Harper’s treating physician sought to medicate him 
against his will pursuant to a Washington policy that read: “[an] inmate 
may be subjected to involuntary treatment . . . only if he (1) suffers from a 
‘mental disorder’ and (2) is ‘gravely disabled’ or poses a ‘likelihood of 
serious harm’ to himself, others, or their property.” 68  However, the 
Washington Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the trial 
court, reasoning that Harper had a liberty interest in refusing these 
antipsychotic medications, and that greater procedural protections—such as 
clear and convincing evidence that medications were both necessary and 
effective for furthering a compelling state interest—were needed when 
“highly intrusive” antipsychotic medications were being administered.69  
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed 
the Washington Supreme Court’s holding.70 The Court found that the state’s 
obligation to provide adequate medical care for its prisoners and its interest 
in decreasing danger and disorder in the prison system were sufficient 
reasons to justify medicating a prisoner against his will.71 Thus, in order to 
forcibly medicate an inmate, the Harper standard requires a finding of an 
inmate’s danger to himself or others and a finding that the medication is in 
the inmate’s medical interest. In the medical arena, this decision means that 
a physician can only forcibly medicate an inmate who is in need of 
treatment if that inmate meets the test for dangerousness.72 A physician may 
not medicate an inmate who is simply disabled or incompetent to make 
healthcare decisions if he or she is not dangerous.73 This restriction in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Cantor, supra note 39, at 133 n.113. 
64 Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 227 (1990).  
65 Id. at 213.  
66 Id. at 214. 
67 Id.  
68 Id. at 215.  
69 Id. at 218.  
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 225.  
72 Cantor, supra note 39, at 134. 
73 Id. 
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criminal prison system gives the inmate somewhat more individual liberty 
than he or she would have in the civil setting.74 
Justice Stevens authored a dissenting opinion in Harper in which 
he attacked the majority’s definition of Harper’s liberty interest and what 
procedures were needed to protect that interest.75 According to Justice 
Stevens, Harper had a fundamental right to refuse anti-psychotic drugs that 
could have serious and permanent side effects, and that could interfere with 
free thought, speech, emotions and beliefs.76 Stevens explained that, “when 
the purpose or effect of forced drugging is to alter the will and the mind of 
the subject, it constitutes a deprivation of liberty in the most literal and 
fundamental sense.”77 Justice Stevens also attacked the majority’s rationale 
that providing drugs was in the best medical interest of Harper, and 
therefore was a legitimate state interest that justified the deprivation of 
Harper’s liberty interest. Justice Stevens argued that the policy used did not 
even require a finding that the drugs would benefit the inmate’s medical 
condition.78 Rather, Justice Stevens maintained that the only state interests 
served in forced medication were administrative and institutional interests 
like ensuring prison security.79 For these reasons, Justice Stevens asserted: 
“I continue to believe that ‘even the inmate retains an unalienable interest in 
liberty—at the very minimum the right to be treated with dignity—which 
the Constitution may never ignore.’”80 
 
V.  INVOLUNTARY MEDICATION AND DEATH ROW PRISONERS 
 
 In both Ford and Panetti, the United States Supreme Court outlined 
the required standard for an inmate to be considered incompetent and 
unable to be executed due to his mental illness. Additionally, in Harper, the 
Court discussed when it is constitutionally permissible to forcibly medicate 
an inmate against his wishes. However, the United States Supreme Court 
has yet to address whether a state may forcibly medicate a death row inmate 
if the purpose is to make him competent to be executed. Several lower 
courts have grappled with this controversial issue. 
 In State v. Perry, the Supreme Court of Louisiana was asked to 
address whether the State of Louisiana could involuntarily medicate death 
row inmate Michael Perry for the sole purpose of making him competent to 
be executed.81  In 1983, Perry murdered his mother, father, nephew and two 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Id. 
75 Harper, at 494 U.S at 237 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
76 Id. at 241 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
77 Id. at 238 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
78 Id. at 249 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
79 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
80 Id. at 258 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 233 (1976) 
(dissenting opinion)). 
81 State v. Perry, 610 So.2d 746, 747 (La. 1992). 
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cousins.82 He was 28 at the time, and had a history of mental illness dating 
back to the age of 16 when he was diagnosed with schizophrenia.83 After 
being in a state mental facility for two years, Perry was permitted by the 
court—but contrary to the advice of his counsel—to be competent to stand 
trial and withdraw his insanity plea to instead plead not guilty.84  
In 1985, Perry was sentenced to death on five counts of murder.85 
However, Perry’s competence to be executed soon became an issue, and 
court-ordered psychiatric evaluations revealed that Perry was competent for 
execution only while he was under the influence of the antipsychotic drug 
Haldol.86 The trial court ruled that Perry was insane but able to understand 
the link between his crime and punishment while taking antipsychotic 
drugs, and thus, the court could forcibly medicate Perry.87 However, on 
appeal, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed this decision and held that 
forcibly medicating Perry violated his rights under the Louisiana 
Constitution because it violated his “right to privacy or personhood,” 
“would constitute cruel, excessive and unusual punishment,” and “fail[ed] 
to measurably contribute to the social goals of capital punishment.” 88 
 In reaching its decision the court noted that the United States 
Supreme Court’s decision in Harper strongly implied that the involuntary 
medication of a prisoner was not allowed for the purpose of punishment, 
and was only appropriate when administering medical treatment in the 
inmate’s best medical interest. The Louisiana Supreme Court ruled that 
Perry’s case was not acceptable under the Harper standard because 
“forcible administration of drugs to implement execution is not medically 
appropriate.”89  The court found that the State had failed to prove that 
medicating Perry furthered “both the best medical interest of the prisoner 
and the state’s own interest in prison safety.”90 Thus, with no compelling 
state interest, the State’s “medicate-to-execute” scheme was 
unconstitutional and must be set aside.91 The court further noted that “[n]o 
insane offender has been executed in the civilized world for centuries,” and 
that the state’s plan was arbitrary in how it was conceived and how it was 
applied to offenders. 92 After Perry, Louisiana’s rule is that a death row 
inmate is not competent to be executed unless he can achieve competence 
on his own without the use of medication.93 	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86 Id. 
87 Id. at 747. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 754.  
90 Id. at 751. 
91 Id. at 755. 
92 Id. at 766. 
93 Cantor, supra note 39, at 138. 
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 In 2003 in Singleton v. Norris, another court—the Eight Circuit 
Court of Appeals—addressed the issue of whether death row inmate 
Charles Singleton could be forcibly medicated to be competent for 
execution.94 Singleton was sentenced to the death penalty in Arkansas in 
1979 for the murder of a 62-year-old convenience store worker.95 At the 
time of the crime and during his trial, there was no sign that Singleton 
suffered from a severe mental illness that would qualify him as incompetent 
to be executed. 96  But by 1987, Singleton’s mental functioning had 
deteriorated and he exhibited severe signs of mental illness.97 He lost a 
considerable amount of weight and, among other things, believed that his 
cell phone was possessed by demons and that a prison doctor had planted a 
device in his right ear to steal his thoughts from him when he read the 
Bible.98 Singleton was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia and initially 
began voluntarily taking antipsychotic medication to control his 
symptoms. 99  However, Singleton would sometimes refuse to take his 
medications and would lapse into a psychosis.100 
After a medication review panel in 1997, Singleton was deemed a 
danger to himself and others, and was placed under a Harper involuntary 
medication order.101 This medication relieved Singleton’s symptoms for a 
short time, but “by February of 1999 he was again withdrawn and exhibited 
a strange speech pattern.”102 The prison responded by twice increasing the 
dose of his medication, but one evaluating doctor questioned whether 
Singleton might be psychotic even while on his medication. 103 
Nevertheless, Singleton was in a difficult dilemma: while the medications 
reduced his overall symptoms and helped calm his hallucinations, they also 
rendered him sane enough for execution.104 As Singleton succinctly put it, 
“Am I too sane to live, or too insane to die?”105 This was the question the 
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals was asked to address.  
 Singleton argued to the court that the involuntary medication order 
that may have been legal under Harper during his stay of execution became 
illegal once his execution date was set. He reasoned that because the 
medication rendered him competent enough to be executed, it was no 
longer in his “best medical interest,” and, therefore, the forced medication 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018 (8th Cir. 2003).  
95 Id. at 1020. 
96 Id. at 1021. 
97 Id. at 1030 (Heaney, J., dissenting).  
98 Id. at 1031 (Heaney, J., dissenting). 
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102 Id. at 1031 (Heaney, J., dissenting). 
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order failed the two-prong Harper analysis. 106  In a close six-to-five 
decision, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals did not agree with Singleton’s 
reasoning. The court held that the government had an essential interest in 
carrying out a lawfully imposed death sentence, and that treatment with 
antipsychotic drugs was necessary to alleviate the symptoms of Singleton’s 
psychosis because there was no less intrusive medical treatment to ensure 
his competence.107 As to violating Singleton’s “best medical interest,” the 
court reasoned that, “the best medical interest of the prisoner must be 
determined without regard to whether there is a pending date of execution . 
. . . [and] the mandatory medication regime . . . does not become 
unconstitutional under Harper when an execution date is set.”108 Thus, the 
majority held that the state of Arkansas could execute a death row prisoner 
whose competence was achieved through involuntarily medication under 
Harper even when that inmate was scheduled for execution. 
 The dissent in Singleton strongly disagreed that a medicated 
Singleton was competent enough for execution.109 Justice Heaney expressed 
the dissent’s opposition by stating, “I believe that to execute a man who is 
severely deranged without treatment, and arguably incompetent when 
treated, is the pinnacle of what Justice Marshall called ‘the barbarity of 
exacting mindless vengeance.’”110 Justice Heaney explained his reasoning 
for opposing the involuntary medication of Charles Singleton. First, he 
argued that receiving antipsychotic drug treatment is not the same as being 
cured.111 Justice Heaney explained: “when antipsychotic medication results 
in an improved mental state, the patient is merely displaying what has been 
termed ‘artificial’ or ‘synthetic’ sanity,” and that drug-induced sanity is 
“temporary and unpredictable.”112 He argued that Singleton was the perfect 
example of the unpredictability of drug-induced sanity: his medication type 
and dosage were constantly in flux as was his psychological stability.  
Next, Justice Heaney argued that the Government’s actual interest 
in exacting Singleton’s punishment undermined its supposed interest in 
medically treating Singleton. Justice Heaney remained skeptical that forced 
medical treatment was in Singleton’s best medical interest when it would 
ultimately aid in his execution. He asserted that the forcible injection of 
anti-psychotic medications into a person’s body interferes with that 
person’s liberty, and that these drugs “can have serious, even fatal, side 
effects.”113  Justice Heaney further asserted that once Singleton’s execution 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 Singleton, 319 F.3d at 1023.  
107 Id. at 1025. 
108 Id. at 1026. 
109 Id. at 1030 (Heaney, J., dissenting). 
110 Id. (Heaney, J., dissenting).  
111 Id. at 1034 (Heaney, J., dissenting). (citing Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 406 
(1986), in which Justice Powell stated in his concurrence that if the insane inmate 
becomes “cured of his disease, the State is [then] free to execute him.”). 
112 Id. (Heaney, J., dissenting).  
113 Id. at 1035 (Heaney, J., dissenting) (quoting Harper, 494 U.S. at 229).  
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date was set, any justification for medicating him under Harper 
disappeared, and that setting the execution date itself seriously called into 
question the State’s supposed motivation for administering drugs in the first 
place.114 Finally, Justice Heaney argued that the majority’s holding in 
Singleton would result in an ethical predicament for treating physicians who 
are bound to act in the best interest of their patients.115 Not treating a 
mentally insane prisoner could “condemn him to a world . . . filled with 
disturbing delusions and hallucinations,” but if a physician did choose to 
treat a mentally ill inmate, it could provide enough short-term relief or 
“artificial” sanity to result in his execution.116  
Despite Justice Heaney’s dissent and the strong controversy 
surrounding Singleton’s execution, in January of 2004, the State of 
Arkansas executed Charles Singleton after twenty-five years on death 
row.117 Singleton’s attorney Jeffrey Rosenzweig described the execution as 
“a shameful mark on the state of Arkansas, because we’re talking about the 
execution of someone who was clearly mentally ill.”118 
 
VI.  A RETURN TO STALEY 
 
In the 2013 case of State v. Staley, the State of Texas was asked to 
address the involuntary medication issue that Perry, Singleton, and various 
other lower courts have grappled with.119 Was death row inmate Steven 
Staley competent to be executed when his competence was only attained by 
a Harper order of involuntary medication?120 On appeal, the Texas Court of 
Criminal Appeals answered that he was not.121 The court reversed the trial 
court’s holding, stating that the trial court lacked the authority to order the 
involuntary medication of Staley. 122  Therefore, Staley could not be 
medicated to restore his competency for execution, and his competency 
finding had to be reversed.123  
In making its decision, the court focused solely on whether the trial 
court had the authority to order the involuntary medication of Staley, and 
failed to address whether forcibly medicating an inmate for the purpose of 
execution violates the Constitution.124 A lower court once again danced 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 Id. at 1036. 
115 Id. (Heaney, J., dissenting). 
116 Id. at 1037 (Heaney, J., dissenting). 
117 Cantor,, supra note 39, at 168. 
118 Cantor, supra note 39, at 168. 
119 Staley v. State, 2013 WL 4820128, at *1 (2013). 
120 Id. at *1.  
121 Id. at *8.  
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124 Diane Jennings, State’s Top Criminal Court Says Trial Courts Can’t Force Death Row 
Inmates to Take Medication, (Sept. 12, 2013), http://www.dallasnews.com/news/state/ 
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around the longstanding question of whether it was constitutional to restore 
an inmate’s competency for the purpose of execution. For Staley, the 
court’s decision means he will spend the rest of his life in limbo: he will 
remain on death row but will not be executed unless he becomes competent 
on his own without forcible medication. For the rest of the United States, 
the court’s decision simply means that our country remains puzzled about 
what to do with a population of criminals that are severely mentally ill and 
on death row.  
 
VII.  BEYOND STALEY: IMPRESSIONS 
 
A current look into statutes, case law, and psychiatric information 
regarding the involuntary medication of a death row inmate leaves a reader 
with almost no firm conclusions. There are conflicting issues and opinions 
regarding the involuntary medication of a death row inmate. In fact, there 
are many conflicting issues and opinions regarding the death penalty itself, 
and these conflicting viewpoints are evidence that our society is extremely 
uncomfortable with the death penalty. At a minimum, it is likely that 
Americans would be uncomfortable with the involuntary medication of a 
death row inmate for the purpose of execution.  As Steven Staley’s attorney 
put it: “It’s time for us to recognize that it’s not civilized to forcibly 
medicate someone to execute them. That doesn’t make any sense.”125 
 
1.  Artificial Competence 
 
A severely mentally ill death row inmate who must be medicated to 
be considered competent is an insane man. Without medication, his insanity 
makes it unconstitutional to execute him. However, with medication—often 
administered against his will—the death row inmate is suddenly competent 
to be executed. This medication calms the inmate enough to prevent 
frightening hallucinations or delusions of paralysis, to prevent fights with 
the guards, and to prevent urinating on himself or eating his own flesh. In 
fact, if powerful enough, these drugs may even mask the death row 
inmate’s symptoms enough so that he looks “sane” and maybe even seems 
“normal.” But under it all, that death row inmate is still an insane man. If 
taken off his drugs, he would still have those same frightening 
hallucinations and delusions, and these powerful antipsychotic drugs are 
merely a temporary solution for an underlying insanity.  
As the Louisiana Supreme Court stated in Perry, even when 
antipsychotic drugs are administered as part of an appropriate medical 
treatment regime, the drugs “merely calm and mask the psychotic 	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symptoms which usually return to debilitate the patient when medication is 
discontinued.” 126  Justice Heaney also discussed this idea of “artificial 
competence” when he concluded that a drug-induced sanity is not the same 
as true sanity, and that the prohibition on executing the insane should apply 
with the same force to a medically-treated insane prisoner whose “insanity 
is merely muted . . . by the powerful drugs he is forced to take.”127 
Executing a man who is only “competent” because he is being forcibly 
administered medication is the same as executing an insane man. And the 
United States Supreme Court has ruled that executing an insane man is 
unconstitutional.128  
 
2.  Liberty Interests 
 
A mentally ill death row inmate who is forcibly medicated suffers 
from substantial interference with his own liberty rights. As the Supreme 
Court discussed in Harper, the forcible injection of antipsychotic 
medication into a non-consenting inmate “represents a substantial 
interference with that person’s liberty.”129 While these antipsychotic drugs 
often have medical benefits, they alter the chemical balance in a patient’s 
brain and can often cause serious and even fatal side effects.130  For this 
reason, courts have ruled that the involuntary administration of these drugs 
in a prison inmate can only occur when the inmate is dangerous to himself 
or others, and it is in the inmate’s best medical interest.131 However, for a 
death row inmate, administering drugs to carry out an execution is never 
going to be in his best “medical interest” because it means killing him. 
Thus, there is no overriding justification for the forcible medication of a 
death row inmate, and the involuntary medication results in a violation of 
his liberty rights. The Louisiana Supreme Court eloquently discussed its 
decision to not forcibly medicate death row inmate Michael Perry because 
it would violate Perry’s own liberty rights and interests: 
 
Unlike other death row prisoners, Perry will be forced to 
yield to the state the control of his mind, thoughts and bodily 
functions, ingest or absorb powerful toxic chemicals, and 
risk or suffer harmful, possibly fatal, drug side effects. He 
will not be afforded a humane exit but will suffer unique 
indignities and degradation. In fact, he will be forced to 
linger for a protracted period, stripped of the vestiges of 
humanity and dignity usually reserved to death row inmates, 	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with the growing awareness that the state is converting his 
mind and body into a vehicle for his execution. In short, 
Perry will be treated as a thing, rather than a human being, 
and deliberately subjected to “something inhuman, 
barbarous” and analogous to torture.132 
 
Although he is a prisoner, a death row inmate is still a human being and has 
certain liberty rights and interests protected by the Constitution. Forcing 
medication on a death row inmate arguably violates those liberty rights. 
 
3.  Physician Ethics 
 
A mentally ill death row inmate who is forcibly medicated for 
purposes of execution creates a difficult dilemma for the treating physician. 
On the one hand, a physician has a duty to treat her patient’s illness and 
render that patient the best care possible.  The physician must offer similar 
treatment to patients with similar medical conditions regardless of 
differentiating factors like race and gender.133 On the other hand, the ethical 
standards of the American Psychiatric Association (“APA”) and the 
American Medical Association (“AMA”) prohibit doctors—“member[s] of 
a profession dedicated to preserving life” 134 —from assisting in the 
execution of a prisoner. 135  Thus, treatment to restore an inmate’s 
competence to be executed is a confusing situation that falls somewhere 
between these two viewpoints. As the AMA’s Committee on Ethical and 
Judicial Affairs explained, “responding to the state’s request to provide 
treatment so that the prisoner’s competence can be reevaluated to determine 
if the sentence can be carried out raises the specter of so close an 
involvement as to transgress the boundary of direct participation in the 
execution itself.”136  
By asking physicians to participate in medicating an inmate to 
reach competence for the ultimate purpose of executing that inmate, we are 
asking physicians to go beyond their duty of care and to venture into an 
unethical area of practice. This request directly contradicts the position the 
Supreme Court has taken in stating that the integrity of the medical 
profession is an interest of great importance that the courts should strive to 
protect.137 The AMA and the APA have further stated that the ethical 
dilemma of treating a mentally ill inmate for purposes of execution could be 	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avoided if states were to adopt a different approach.138 The AMA and APA 
recommend reducing the death row inmate’s sentence to life in prison 
without the possibility of parole.139 In so doing, a physician would be free 
to treat an inmate without the fear that she was participating in the inmate’s 
ultimate execution (by restoring the inmate’s competence). Maryland is one 
state that has taken this recommended approach by enacting a statute stating 
that once an inmate is declared incompetent, a death sentence is 
automatically reduced to life.140 Perhaps by listening more to the medical 
profession, our courts and our legislatures could reach decisions—similar to 
the State of Maryland—that do not place physicians in situations where 
they are asked to act unethically.  
This past year, the state of Texas withdrew Steven Staley’s 
execution date and forced medication order, and declared him incompetent 
to be executed because of his mental illness.141 This decision was a step in 
the right direction for the estimated twenty percent of prisoners suffering 
from severe mental illness.142 However, our society still has much work to 
do. Similar to Charles Singleton and Scott Panetti, other death row inmates 
like John Ferguson (Florida), Edwin Turner (Mississippi), and Troy Davis 
(Georgia) have been executed when evidence clearly indicated that they 
suffered from severe mental illness.143  
Mental illness has no constitutional protection against the death 
penalty like insanity and intellectual disability do. When enacting a 
constitutional ban on executing the insane, the Supreme Court stated that 
the Eighth Amendment’s ban on “cruel and unusual punishment” 
recognizes the “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society.” 144  Considerations of humanity and decency are 
constantly evolving as our society matures and progresses. As the Supreme 
Court recognized a ban on executing the insane, it needs to recognize a ban 
on executing the mentally ill. States that impose the death penalty also need 
to adopt individual state laws like Maryland that reduce a death sentence to 
life in prison without parole if an inmate is rendered incompetent to be 
executed while on death row. This would also help the often tense 
relationship between the law and the medical profession by allowing 
doctors to treat mentally ill inmates without fear of facilitating their 
execution.  	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States need to ban the involuntary administration of drugs to a 
death row inmate for the purpose of rendering him competent to be 
executed. With an estimated twenty percent of the prison population 
suffering from mental illness, mentally ill prisoners are desperate for help 
and treatment, but not at the expense of their own life and liberty. Instead of 
involuntarily medicating prisoners for the purpose of enabling an execution, 
our society needs to address the larger issue of treating the mentally ill. 
Execution is never going to be a viable solution to the issue of mental 
illness, and when it is offered as an option for our society, it only stands in 
the way of overall treatment. 
